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Israel, Hezbollah Have a Deal

By the time you read this, the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah will have ceased, ideally for the foreseeable future. This is because leaders on both sides have agreed to a ceasefire that was negotiated with significant input and pressure from the United States and France.

The broad contours of the deal are pretty basic, even if not all details are publicly known. First and foremost, the shooting stops (though Israel did get in one last, big volley right before the deadline—a sadly common feature of ceasefire deals in the 20th and 21st centuries). In addition, Israel has retained some ability to respond to further provocations from Hezbollah, should the need arise. This is the part that's hazy, as the specific allowances being granted to the Israeli government by the U.S. are currently secret. Finally, France and the U.S. will join the "tripartite mechanism" created after the previous Hezbollah-Israel war (in 2006), with the U.S. taking over as chair. The tripartite mechanism is basically an arbitration panel that tries to settle disputes between the two sides. It was originally made up of Lebanon, Israel and a contingent from the United Nations. With France and the U.S. joining up, it's now a quinquepartite mechanism, though we doubt that label will catch on, since very few people know that word.

And now, here are some questions. We do not presume to know the answers to them; again, this is way far away from our area of expertise:

  1. Will the peace last?: Although we don't have any expertise here, this is a question that many other people, who do have expertise, have weighed in on. In short, Hezbollah and its two backers (Lebanon and Iran) have been worn down by this conflict, and continuing it was getting difficult. Meanwhile, Israel is less worn down, but is still stretched thin by fighting on three fronts. Plus, Israel has largely achieved what it wanted to achieve, in terms of moving unwanted people out of its territory. Since neither side is strongly motivated to keep fighting, there's a pretty good chance the peace will hold for a while, particularly if it survives the delicate first couple of weeks.

  2. Will Joe Biden get any credit for this?: He really should, since he and his envoy, Amos Hochstein, were the key figures in bringing the peace agreement to fruition. That said, Republicans don't give Biden credit for anything, ever. And many of the Democrats, and others, who have been voting based on events in that part of the world, have already dismissed Biden as "Genocide Joe." They are not likely to change their views, even when presented with evidence that runs pretty contrary to those views.

  3. Will Donald Trump get any credit for this?: He really shouldn't, since he and his team didn't have anything to do with it (although they have been getting briefings). That said, the Republican spin machine is very powerful, and we can envision something along these lines: "Hezbollah knew they had to get while the gettin' was good, because in just a few weeks, there will be a new sheriff in town."

  4. Will it even have a domestic political impact?: Maybe, but maybe not. Do you know, off the top of your head, how long Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting? The answer is 14 months. And yet, that part of the conflict has not gotten a fraction of the attention, either from the media or from protesters, that Gaza has. It is true that more people have died in Gaza, but the impacts on the Lebanese people have been nothing to sneeze at. Over 5,000 dead, over 1 million people displaced, as well as much famine, shortage of supplies, etc. Nonetheless, for whatever reason, this really hasn't moved the needle much. So, maybe the news of the ceasefire will be met with a shrug.

The bad news here is that the situation in Gaza is no closer to a resolution today than it was yesterday, and there's every reason to think things will get worse for those people before they get better, starting on, oh, say, January 20 of next year. The good news here is that because Israel-Hezbollah involved numerous foreign actors, including the large and rather dangerous nation of Iran, it was the part of the conflict most likely to spiral out of control and possibly turn into something much bigger. Now, the chances of that are much reduced. (Z)

Trump Signs Transition Agreement... Sort Of

This is exceedingly inside baseball, although it's also not a great omen when it comes to the incoming presidential administration. Since 2010, consistent with updates to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, presidents-elect have signed a set of memorandums that allow them to begin preparations for taking over the government. First is a group of agreements with the White House and various executive agencies that allow for new appointees to get FBI background checks and to begin learning the ropes of their new jobs. Second is an agreement with the General Services Administration (GSA) that provides $7.2 million in funds, office space, computers and networking, and other such support. In exchange for this, a campaign submits itself to GSA oversight (including, for example, cybersecurity precautions) and also agrees to limit donor contributions to the transition to no more than $5,000 per person.

Since his election several weeks ago, Donald Trump has been signalling that he might not sign any of the documents, despite the fact that there is actually a legally mandated deadline of October 1. Yesterday, he and his team semi-relented, and they signed a partial transition agreement (which you can read here, if you wish). That is apparently the end of what Team Trump is willing to do, and so the transition will move forward on this basis.

Because Trump only signed a partial transition agreement, but none of the sub-agreements with specific agencies, and no agreement with the GSA, it means that there will be several things missing from the process. First, no automatic FBI background checks. Though having been warned that this puts the nation at risk, and may make it harder to confirm some appointees, Trump and his team say they don't find the background checks to be necessary. Second, any sensitive data that the incoming administration receives in the next 6 weeks or so will be protected by Trump's cybersecurity team, and not by the federal government. Readers can decide for themselves how they feel about that, perhaps while recalling "but her e-mails" from 2016. Third, and finally, the sky's the limit for how much money "supporters" donate to Trump and his transition team. There may also be no limits as to exactly WHO is donating. Incoming Chief of Staff Susie Wiles framed all of this as an effort to save taxpayers money, and said that Trump would be "very transparent" about whatever donations are received. Again, readers can decide for themselves if they believe... any of that.

Unfortunately, the Biden White House was over a barrel here. From a political standpoint, if the President had made an issue of this, it would have been framed as sour grapes, even though that's not correct. From a legal standpoint, even if Biden wanted to do something, what could he do? Run to court? Ask Congress to pass additional, enforcing legislation? These paths seem unlikely to produce useful results, particularly on an expedited timeline. Heck, does anyone even know where Clarence Thomas and his RV are right now? And from a practical standpoint, it would not be great to, say, hand the keys to the Department of Defense over to the incoming secretary (whether Pete Hegseth or someone else) on January 20 and declare, "Well, good luck with it!" For the good of the country, these people have to be given some sort of orientation, even if their leader is choosing to do so under a partial and very possibly corrupt cloak of non-oversight. (Z)

Today in Appointments News

Donald Trump announced a few more significant appointments (though, again, the biggies have all been announced, at least until one or more of them has to withdraw). Here are the new fish:

And that's the kind of day it's been. (Z)

Who Are the Senate's (Potential) Rebels?

We've written quite a bit about Donald Trump's first wave(s) of nominees, and have pointed out some of them who might struggle to be confirmed. That list includes Pete Hegseth (Defense), Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (HHS), Tulsi Gabbard (DNI) and John Phelan (Navy). We thought it was about time to take a look at the other side of the equation, and try to identify where the Republican "no" votes might come from. In alphabetical order, here are the ten most likely roadblocks:

  1. Bill Cassidy (LA): He is a physician, is pro-vaxx, and is about to take over the Senate's Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee. Cassidy may not be too keen to vote to approve quack and quack-adjacent nominees. Oh, and he's one of three Republican members of the 119th Senate who voted to convict Trump during his second impeachment.

  2. Susan Collins (ME): It is true that Collins pretends to be more moderate than she really is. However, it is also true that she's the only Republican senator up for reelection in 2026 in a state Kamala Harris won. It is further true that she, like Cassidy, voted to convict Trump during his second impeachment hearing. She might well hold the line on some of the crazypants nominees.

  3. John Cornyn (TX): Cornyn is a Reagan Republican (or, really, a Bush Republican, since he's from Texas). He has also been angling to take over leadership of the Senate, which obviously didn't happen. He'll turn 73 next year, and may decide the time has come to wind things down. If so, he could find himself free to vote his politics, as opposed to voting for what IS politic.

  4. John Curtis (UT): Among ruby-red states, Utah is the least Trump-friendly. The sizable LDS population is none too interested in what the Democrats are selling, but they also don't like Trump's cruel instincts or his total lack of charity. Curtis ran to replace Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) as a centrist who will hold Trump at arm's length. And although he's not even in the Senate yet, he helped scuttle the Matt Gaetz nomination. What we're saying here is that we could be looking at another Romney, except with a spine (and note that even Romney voted to convict Trump during the second impeachment).

  5. Joni Ernst (IA): She is, at least outwardly, pretty Trumpy. However, she also represents a state that is very dependent on both subsidies and the trading of farm products to other countries. Trump's policies could be problematic for her, on both fronts. Oh, and Iowa is closer to being purple than you might think, and Ernst has to win reelection in a non-presidential year in 2026.

  6. Mitch McConnell (KY): He hates Trump and, at this point in his career, he has nothing to lose. He hasn't said if he will run for reelection in 2026. He would be almost 91 at the end of another Senate term. Turtles live a long time if they can bask in the sun, but his basking days are over and even they don't live forever. The smart money is betting that he won't run for reelection in 2026, thus freeing him up to vote as he pleases. He's already promised that "I'm going to make John McCain sound like a dove," so there could be real problems here for unqualified/isolationist military establishment nominees, like Hegseth. Oh, and McConnell is another of the senators who helped bring down Matt Gaetz.

  7. Lisa Murkowski (AK): She is the least reliable Republican vote in the Senate. Of course, she's the third (and final) member of the 119th Senate who voted to convict Trump during the second impeachment trial. She also does not see eye-to-eye with Trump on policy a lot of the time. Further, because of Alaska's ranked choice voting, she doesn't have to worry about being primaried by a nutty Trumper. Thus far, she's been the most outspokenly critical of many of Trump's nominees. She's also the only Republican senator who says openly that she did not vote for Trump this year.

  8. John Thune (SD): If Thune actually votes against Trump, it will likely be because of the parliamentary rule that only someone on the "winning" side can bring a matter up for reconsideration. So, for example, if Gabbard is going down in flames, and Thune thinks he'd like to take another bite at the apple in the future, it would generally be on him as Majority Leader to switch his vote to "no" so he would be able to bring her up again. Behind the scenes, however, Thune will have primary responsibility (aided by the advice of close ally McConnell) for trying to tamp down the worst elements of Trumpism. Only he knows what he thinks those are, however.

  9. Thom Tillis (NC): As we've written previously, Tillis is up in 2026 in a state that just elected a slate of Democratic officeholders statewide. He can't veer too far left, or he'll get primaried. He can't veer too far right, or he could be in trouble in the general. He'll have to proceed cautiously, but he certainly has political cover for voting against Trump on matters that might hurt North Carolina (for example, the state exports a lot of tobacco, and would not be happy about a bunch of protectionists running the economy). In 2026, he can tell conservatives that "I'm a North Carolinian first and a Trumper second" and he can tell moderates "See, I don't just blindly follow the party line."

  10. Todd Young (IN): Because Young comes from a red state, the automatic assumption is that he's Trumpy. In fact, he is not. Don't look now, but he pointedly did not endorse Trump this cycle. Young is also a Navy vet and a big believer in NATO and other international alliances, so that could put him at loggerheads with the President-elect sometimes. He probably cares very much who is secretary of the Navy.

We would be remiss if we did not note that it's a two-way street, and there are at least some Democrats who might cross the aisle, depending on the circumstances. Here are the five non-Republicans most likely to do that:

  1. John Fetterman (D-PA): Among the senators who actually call themselves Democrats, Fetterman is probably the biggest wildcard remaining. He marches to the beat of his own drum, has impeccable left-wing bonafides on some issues (say, labor concerns) and is quite right-wing on others (say, Israel). Because this is his "brand," he can get away with bucking the party line sometimes. Also, he does eventually have to run for reelection (in 2028) in a state that Trump just won—albeit by a hair.

  2. Mark Kelly (D-AZ): There are some Democrats who might be a bit more conservative than is publicly known, as Joe Manchin (I-WV), Kyrsten Sinema (I-AZ) and sometimes Jon Tester (D-MT) took nearly all the withering fire when torpedoing legislation that was a little too lefty for their tastes. Now, all three of them are gone, and there's gotta be some Democrat who is now the most centrist/Blue Dog-like. Kelly is a candidate for that mantle, coming from a purple state, as he does. In particular, he might have to line up with Trump, sometimes, especially on border-related matters.

  3. Angus King (I-ME): There's a reason he's an I and not a D; he votes liberal about 60% of the time, conservative the other 40%. The things he leans right on don't align well with Trumpism, generally speaking, although King is somewhat friendly to trade protectionism.

  4. Jon Ossoff (D-GA): He's got to play a similar game to Thom Tillis, in that he's up in 2026, and in a state that was pretty red this year. However, while Tillis is at risk of being primaried by a nutter, Ossoff probably isn't, because Democrats are not likely to risk losing their most electable candidate. That means that Ossoff has both cover and motivation to tack center-ward or right-ward, on occasion.

  5. Gary Peters (D-MI): He's up in 2026 in a state Trump won (albeit barely). Peters tends to be a loyal party man, but he does represent a state that produces a lot of cars. So, he might find something in Trump's economic policy that is amenable, for example, high tariffs on Chinese cars.

We wrote this primarily with an eye towards confirming appointments, but it also applies to legislation. Most of these people will remain on their side of the aisle most of the time, but some of them will definitely cross, on occasion. Also, let us offer another reminder that nominees are rarely rejected outright; it's much more common for senators to work behind the scenes to secure their withdrawal, so everyone can save face. (Z)

"What's Actionable Here?", Part II: The Sky Is Falling

Yesterday, we had an item where we expressed our low regard for a politician's analysis of the 2024 election. Today, we'd like to share a few election postmortem quotes from pundits:

We actually had a lot more, but decided to just run with these three, because they get a little repetitive. You get the point; the Democratic Party is a mess, and needs to make BIG CHANGES.

We suspect—though maybe we are wrong on this—that some readers are already on to our little game. The first quote is most certainly from this year. The second is from after the Democrats' defeat in 2016. And the third is after the Party took it in the teeth in 2004.

As a reminder, here's what happened in the next two elections after the second and third postmortems were written:

The point here is presumably obvious. The 2004 and 2016 pieces were written by people who were seeing "apocalypse," when it was really just "the usual ebbs and flows of the American political system."

It is fair to guess that is (largely) what happened this year, as well. There are many Chicken Littles right now, writing many pieces about how the sky is falling. However, they are surely speaking from a place of emotion and, in particular, fear. Understandable, but not on target. Even an early analysis supports the conclusion that the recent election wasn't really disastrous for the Democrats, even if the results were a huge disappointment to members of the Party. And note, we could have done this exact same exercise with the Republican Party, and the response of pundits on that side of the aisle in 1992, 2008, and 2020.

Anyhow, although it may seem like this series is about taking potshots at bad political analysis, it's not. This piece, and the one yesterday, were just the introduction. In subsequent pieces, we want to try to look at what really happened, things that might be actionable, things that we think are not actionable, and things that we think were beyond the control of any politician or political party.

Oh, and we will give just one more quote:

The language is a little archaic, but the analysis feels awfully familiar. That was written by a left-leaning newspaper in 1928, and we know what happened for the Democrats in 1932... (Z)


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