By the time you read this, the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah will have ceased, ideally for the
foreseeable future. This is because leaders on both sides
have agreed
to a ceasefire that was negotiated with significant input and pressure from the United States and France.
The broad contours of the deal are pretty basic, even if not all details are publicly known. First and foremost, the
shooting stops (though Israel did get in one last, big volley right before the deadline—a sadly common feature of
ceasefire deals in the 20th and 21st centuries). In addition, Israel has retained some ability to respond to further
provocations from Hezbollah, should the need arise. This is the part that's hazy, as the specific allowances being
granted to the Israeli government by the U.S. are currently secret. Finally, France and the U.S. will join the
"tripartite mechanism" created after the previous Hezbollah-Israel war (in 2006), with the U.S. taking over as
chair. The tripartite mechanism is basically an arbitration panel that tries to settle disputes between the two
sides. It was originally made up of Lebanon, Israel and a contingent from the United Nations. With France and
the U.S. joining up, it's now a quinquepartite mechanism, though we doubt that label will catch on, since very few
people know that word.
And now, here are some questions. We do not presume to know the answers to them; again, this is way far away from our
area of expertise:
Will the peace last?: Although we don't have any expertise here, this is a question that
many other people, who do have expertise, have weighed in on. In short, Hezbollah and its two backers (Lebanon and Iran)
have been worn down by this conflict, and continuing it was getting difficult. Meanwhile, Israel is less worn down, but
is still stretched thin by fighting on three fronts. Plus, Israel has largely achieved what it wanted to achieve, in
terms of moving unwanted people out of its territory. Since neither side is strongly motivated to keep fighting, there's
a pretty good chance the peace will hold for a while, particularly if it survives the delicate first couple of weeks.
Will Joe Biden get any credit for this?: He really should, since he and his envoy, Amos
Hochstein, were the key figures in bringing the peace agreement to fruition. That said, Republicans don't give Biden
credit for anything, ever. And many of the Democrats, and others, who have been voting based on events in that part of
the world, have already dismissed Biden as "Genocide Joe." They are not likely to change their views, even when
presented with evidence that runs pretty contrary to those views.
Will Donald Trump get any credit for this?: He really shouldn't, since he and his team
didn't have anything to do with it (although they have been getting briefings). That said, the Republican spin machine
is very powerful, and we can envision something along these lines: "Hezbollah knew they had to get while the gettin' was
good, because in just a few weeks, there will be a new sheriff in town."
Will it even have a domestic political impact?: Maybe, but maybe not. Do you know, off the
top of your head, how long Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting? The answer is 14 months. And yet, that part of the
conflict has not gotten a fraction of the attention, either from the media or from protesters, that Gaza has. It is true
that more people have died in Gaza, but the impacts on the Lebanese people have been nothing to sneeze at. Over 5,000
dead, over 1 million people displaced, as well as much famine, shortage of supplies, etc. Nonetheless, for whatever
reason, this really hasn't moved the needle much. So, maybe the news of the ceasefire will be met with a shrug.
The bad news here is that the situation in Gaza is no closer to a resolution today than it was yesterday, and there's
every reason to think things will get worse for those people before they get better, starting on, oh, say, January 20 of
next year. The good news here is that because Israel-Hezbollah involved numerous foreign actors, including the large and
rather dangerous nation of Iran, it was the part of the conflict most likely to spiral out of control and possibly turn
into something much bigger. Now, the chances of that are much reduced. (Z)
This is exceedingly inside baseball, although it's also not a great omen when it comes to the incoming presidential
administration. Since 2010, consistent with updates to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, presidents-elect have
signed a set of memorandums that allow them to begin preparations for taking over the government. First is a group of
agreements with the White House and various executive agencies that allow for new appointees to get FBI background
checks and to begin learning the ropes of their new jobs. Second is an agreement with the General Services
Administration (GSA) that provides $7.2 million in funds, office space, computers and networking, and other such
support. In exchange for this, a campaign submits itself to GSA oversight (including, for example, cybersecurity
precautions) and also agrees to limit donor contributions to the transition to no more than $5,000 per person.
Since his election several weeks ago, Donald Trump has been signalling that he might not sign any of the documents,
despite the fact that there is actually a legally mandated deadline of October 1. Yesterday, he and his team semi-relented,
and they signed a partial transition agreement (which you can read
here,
if you wish). That is apparently the end of what Team Trump is willing to do, and so the transition will move forward on
this basis.
Because Trump only signed a partial transition agreement, but none of the sub-agreements with specific agencies, and
no agreement with the GSA, it means that there will be several things missing from the process. First, no automatic FBI
background checks. Though having been warned that this puts the nation at risk, and may make it harder to confirm some
appointees, Trump and his team say they don't find the background checks to be necessary. Second, any sensitive data
that the incoming administration receives in the next 6 weeks or so will be protected by Trump's cybersecurity team, and
not by the federal government. Readers can decide for themselves how they feel about that, perhaps while recalling "but
her e-mails" from 2016. Third, and finally, the sky's the limit for how much money "supporters" donate to Trump and his
transition team. There may also be no limits as to exactly WHO is donating. Incoming Chief of Staff Susie Wiles framed
all of this as an effort to save taxpayers money, and said that Trump would be "very transparent" about whatever
donations are received. Again, readers can decide for themselves if they believe... any of that.
Unfortunately, the Biden White House was over a barrel here. From a political standpoint, if the President had made
an issue of this, it would have been framed as sour grapes, even though that's not correct. From a legal standpoint,
even if Biden wanted to do something, what could he do? Run to court? Ask Congress to pass additional, enforcing
legislation? These paths seem unlikely to produce useful results, particularly on an expedited timeline. Heck, does
anyone even know where Clarence Thomas and his RV are right now? And from a practical standpoint, it would not be great
to, say, hand the keys to the Department of Defense over to the incoming secretary (whether Pete Hegseth or someone
else) on January 20 and declare, "Well, good luck with it!" For the good of the country, these people have to be given
some sort of orientation, even if their leader is choosing to do so under a partial and very possibly corrupt cloak of
non-oversight. (Z)
Donald Trump announced a few more significant appointments (though, again, the biggies have all been announced,
at least until one or more of them has to withdraw). Here are the new fish:
U.S. Trade Representative: Although all the Cabinet positions have been taken, this is
one of the Cabinet-level jobs that had no nominee. Trump's
pick is
Jamieson Greer, a 44-year-old corporate lawyer who served as right-hand man to the U.S. Trade Representative from the
previous Trump administration, Robert Lighthizer. Greer is pretty fanatical about tariffs and protectionism, and about
reducing the United States' trade deficit, and will be responsible for implementing whatever steps Trump takes (or tries
to take) on that front. Of course, he may well be out of a job by 2028, by virtue of no countries being willing to trade
with the U.S. anymore.
Director of the White House National Economic Council: An "insider" job that everyone in
Washington knows about, and few people outside Washington know about. The occupant of this particular post coordinates
economic policy across agencies and is not subject to Senate confirmation. Trump
has chosen
Kevin Hassett, a Penn-trained economist who served in the previous Trump administration as Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers (a similar kind of job), and who has otherwise spent most of his career employed by right-wing think
tanks. Hassett is best known for co-authoring the 1999 book Dow 36,000, which predicted that the Dow Jones
Industrial Average was about to spike, and a DJIA of 36,000 was right around the corner. He was off by a mere... 22
years (the Dow finally reached 36,000 in 2021). Hassett's another tariff guy, though his real passion is tax cuts for
rich people.
Director of the Domestic Policy Council: Another "insider" job that is not subject to
Senate confirmation. The holder of this post coordinates domestic policy across agencies. For this one, Trump
selected
Vince Haley. Haley had been working for Trump as a speechwriter, and before that was an aide to Newt Gingrich for 12 years.
That pretty much tells you where he's at, politically.
Director of the National Institutes of Health: For this post, Trump has
tapped
Dr. Jay Bhattacharya. He is Stanford-trained, and is now on the faculty at that university, and is a well-respected
medical researcher. That said, the reason he is well known, and the reason that Trump picked him, is that while the
Doctor is generally pro-vaxx, he was the main author of the
Great Barrington Declaration,
published at the height of the COVID pandemic. It argued that mask mandates and lockdowns should be dropped, and that
the best way forward was for everyone to get sick and thus for herd immunity to develop. This, by the way, was months
before any vaccine was available, even for clinical trials. In short, Bhattacharya might be described as 50% Anthony Fauci,
50% Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Well, OK, 25% Fauci, 75% Kennedy.
Secretary of the Navy: Trump's
nominee here
is John Phelan, who has never served in the military, and thus has never served in the Navy, although we do understand
he owns a copy of The Village People's
greatest hits.
We are having trouble figuring out what qualifies him for this position; all we seem to be able to learn about him is
that he's a private equity tycoon who donated millions to Trump's PACs. Oh well, one day we'll figure out why he got the
nod. In any event, this job is Senate-confirmed, and it's possible the senators might choke on this one, given Phelan's
background. That said, there have been past secretaries without naval/military experience, and there were also a couple
of non-veteran assistant secretaries named Roosevelt who worked out pretty well. So, maybe the Senate won't mind.
We've written quite a bit about Donald Trump's first wave(s) of nominees, and have pointed out some of them who might
struggle to be confirmed. That list includes Pete Hegseth (Defense), Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (HHS), Tulsi Gabbard (DNI) and
John Phelan (Navy). We thought it was about time to take a look at the other side of the equation, and try to identify where
the Republican "no" votes might come from. In alphabetical order, here are the ten most likely roadblocks:
Bill Cassidy (LA): He is a physician, is pro-vaxx, and is about to take over the
Senate's Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee. Cassidy may not be too keen to vote to approve quack
and quack-adjacent nominees. Oh, and he's one of three Republican members of the 119th Senate who voted to
convict Trump during his second impeachment.
Susan Collins (ME): It is true that Collins pretends to be more moderate than
she really is. However, it is also true that she's the only Republican senator up for reelection in 2026 in a
state Kamala Harris won. It is further true that she, like Cassidy, voted to convict Trump during his second
impeachment hearing. She might well hold the line on some of the crazypants nominees.
John Cornyn (TX): Cornyn is a Reagan Republican (or, really, a Bush Republican,
since he's from Texas). He has also been angling to take over leadership of the Senate, which obviously didn't
happen. He'll turn 73 next year, and may decide the time has come to wind things down. If so, he could find
himself free to vote his politics, as opposed to voting for what IS politic.
John Curtis (UT): Among ruby-red states, Utah is the least Trump-friendly. The
sizable LDS population is none too interested in what the Democrats are selling, but they also don't like
Trump's cruel instincts or his total lack of charity. Curtis ran to replace Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) as a
centrist who will hold Trump at arm's length. And although he's not even in the Senate yet, he helped scuttle the
Matt Gaetz nomination. What we're saying here is that we could be looking at another Romney, except with a
spine (and note that even Romney voted to convict Trump during the second impeachment).
Joni Ernst (IA): She is, at least outwardly, pretty Trumpy. However, she also
represents a state that is very dependent on both subsidies and the trading of farm products to other countries.
Trump's policies could be problematic for her, on both fronts. Oh, and Iowa is closer to being purple than
you might think, and Ernst has to win reelection in a non-presidential year in 2026.
Mitch McConnell (KY): He hates Trump and, at this point in his career, he has
nothing to lose.
He hasn't said if he will run for reelection in 2026. He would be almost 91 at the end of another Senate term.
Turtles live a long time if they can bask in the sun, but his basking days are over and even they don't live
forever. The smart money is betting that he won't run for reelection in 2026, thus freeing him up to vote as he pleases.
He's already promised that "I'm going to make John McCain sound like a dove," so there could
be real problems here for unqualified/isolationist military establishment nominees, like Hegseth. Oh, and
McConnell is another of the senators who helped bring down Matt Gaetz.
Lisa Murkowski (AK): She is the least reliable Republican vote in the Senate. Of course,
she's the third (and final) member of the 119th Senate who voted to convict Trump during the second impeachment trial.
She also does not see eye-to-eye with Trump on policy a lot of the time. Further, because of Alaska's ranked choice
voting, she doesn't have to worry about being primaried by a nutty Trumper. Thus far, she's been the most outspokenly
critical of many of Trump's nominees. She's also the only Republican senator who says openly that she did not vote for
Trump this year.
John Thune (SD): If Thune actually votes against Trump, it will likely
be because of the parliamentary rule that only someone on the "winning" side can bring a matter up for
reconsideration. So, for example, if Gabbard is going down in flames, and Thune thinks he'd like to
take another bite at the apple in the future, it would generally be on him as Majority Leader to
switch his vote to "no" so he would be able to bring her up again. Behind the scenes, however,
Thune will have primary responsibility (aided by the advice of close ally McConnell) for trying to
tamp down the worst elements of Trumpism. Only he knows what he thinks those are, however.
Thom Tillis (NC): As we've written previously, Tillis is up in 2026 in a state that just
elected a slate of Democratic officeholders statewide. He can't veer too far left, or he'll get primaried. He can't veer
too far right, or he could be in trouble in the general. He'll have to proceed cautiously, but he certainly has
political cover for voting against Trump on matters that might hurt North Carolina (for example, the state exports a lot
of tobacco, and would not be happy about a bunch of protectionists running the economy). In 2026, he can tell conservatives
that "I'm a North Carolinian first and a Trumper second" and he can tell moderates "See, I don't just blindly follow
the party line."
Todd Young (IN): Because Young comes from a red state, the automatic
assumption is that he's Trumpy. In fact, he is not. Don't look now, but he pointedly did not endorse Trump
this cycle. Young is also a Navy vet and a big believer in NATO and other international alliances, so that
could put him at loggerheads with the President-elect sometimes.
He probably cares very much who is secretary of the Navy.
We would be remiss if we did not note that it's a two-way street, and there are at least some Democrats who might cross
the aisle, depending on the circumstances. Here are the five non-Republicans most likely to do that:
John Fetterman (D-PA): Among the senators who actually call themselves Democrats,
Fetterman is probably the biggest wildcard remaining. He marches to the beat of his own drum, has impeccable left-wing
bonafides on some issues (say, labor concerns) and is quite right-wing on others (say, Israel). Because this is his
"brand," he can get away with bucking the party line sometimes. Also, he does eventually have to run for reelection (in
2028) in a state that Trump just won—albeit by a hair.
Mark Kelly (D-AZ): There are some Democrats who might be a bit more conservative than is
publicly known, as Joe Manchin (I-WV), Kyrsten Sinema (I-AZ) and sometimes Jon Tester (D-MT) took nearly all the
withering fire when torpedoing legislation that was a little too lefty for their tastes. Now, all three of them are
gone, and there's gotta be some Democrat who is now the most centrist/Blue Dog-like. Kelly is a candidate for that
mantle, coming from a purple state, as he does. In particular, he might have to line up with Trump, sometimes, especially on
border-related matters.
Angus King (I-ME): There's a reason he's an I and not a D; he votes liberal about 60% of
the time, conservative the other 40%. The things he leans right on don't align well with Trumpism, generally speaking,
although King is somewhat friendly to trade protectionism.
Jon Ossoff (D-GA): He's got to play a similar game to Thom Tillis, in that he's up in
2026, and in a state that was pretty red this year. However, while Tillis is at risk of being primaried by a nutter,
Ossoff probably isn't, because Democrats are not likely to risk losing their most electable candidate. That means that
Ossoff has both cover and motivation to tack center-ward or right-ward, on occasion.
Gary Peters (D-MI): He's up in 2026 in a state Trump won (albeit barely). Peters tends to
be a loyal party man, but he does represent a state that produces a lot of cars. So, he might find something in Trump's
economic policy that is amenable, for example, high tariffs on Chinese cars.
We wrote this primarily with an eye towards confirming appointments, but it also applies to legislation. Most of
these people will remain on their side of the aisle most of the time, but some of them will definitely cross, on occasion.
Also, let us offer another reminder that nominees are rarely rejected outright; it's much more common for senators to
work behind the scenes to secure their withdrawal, so everyone can save face. (Z)
Yesterday, we had
an item
where we expressed our low regard for a politician's analysis of the 2024 election. Today, we'd like to share a few
election postmortem quotes from pundits:
Based on the Democrats' personnel decisions and public statements, you'd have no idea the party lost control of all
three branches of government last week. Literal congratulations have been doled out for tough losses in a
near-impossible electoral environment, for a spirited effort amid utter defeat. It's almost as if Democratic leadership
hadn't spent the entire fall projecting publicly that the electoral environment was tight but winnable.
Now that it's clear they were wrong, there has been basically zero accountability. No real reckoning from the Democratic
National Committee on how it managed to spend $1 billion on the only Democratic presidential popular vote loss in 20
years. No apologies from Sen. Chuck Schumer and other members of leadership for embracing the crypto industry, which
promptly turned around and spent tens of millions of dollars against Democrats in tight races, including the
all-important Ohio Senate race, which Dems lost. No introspective messaging about losing not just the presidency but the
Senate and the House.
Narrow defeats in the Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan proved the mortal blow to the [Democrats],
and the losing margins were due in part to Mr. Trump's performance among the state's blue-collar rural voters.
They had been a key component of the Democrat's winning presidential coalitions in both the 1990s and 2000s, but had
been swept up by Mr. Trump's populist movement.
"We need to regroup and figure it out," says Eve Harmon. "Maybe party politics is not even the way to talk about. What
do we want to see this country be?"
She says the party should prioritise education reform—although she does have an ulterior motive, given that white
voters without a college education were some of Mr. Trump's most loyal supporters.
"Education really does matter because what I think we're seeing here is a lot of really uneducated people voting for
somebody that they think will help them—and they're misinformed," she said.
For the Democrats, there could be a long and dark journey before they once again emerge from the political wilderness.
God and a newly triumphant Republican president are once again in the headlines. And there are signs that the present
national divide, between the narrow but solid Republican majority and a Democratic party seemingly trapped in second
place, may be hardening into a pattern that will persist for years to come.
Democrats, especially, are left to wonder: What will it take to break the pattern -- an act of God?
We actually had a lot more, but decided to just run with these three, because they get a little repetitive. You get the
point; the Democratic Party is a mess, and needs to make BIG CHANGES.
We suspect—though maybe we are wrong on this—that some readers are already on to our little game. The first
quote is most certainly from this year. The second is from after the Democrats' defeat in 2016. And the third is after the
Party took it in the teeth in 2004.
As a reminder, here's what happened in the next two elections after the second and third postmortems were written:
2006: Democrats gain 5 Senate seats, 30 House seats
2008: Democrats gain the presidency, 7 Senate seats, 21 House seats
2018: Democrats lose 2 Senate seats, gain 41 House seats
2020: Democrats gain the presidency, 3 Senate seats, lose 11 House seats
The point here is presumably obvious. The 2004 and 2016 pieces were written by people who were seeing "apocalypse,"
when it was really just "the usual ebbs and flows of the American political system."
It is fair to guess that is (largely) what happened this year, as well. There are many Chicken Littles right now,
writing many pieces about how the sky is falling. However, they are surely speaking from a place of emotion and, in
particular, fear. Understandable, but not on target. Even an early analysis supports the conclusion that the recent
election wasn't really disastrous for the Democrats, even if the results were a huge disappointment to members of the
Party. And note, we could have done this exact same exercise with the Republican Party, and the response of pundits on
that side of the aisle in 1992, 2008, and 2020.
Anyhow, although it may seem like this series is about taking potshots at bad political analysis, it's not. This
piece, and the one yesterday, were just the introduction. In subsequent pieces, we want to try to look at what really
happened, things that might be actionable, things that we think are not actionable, and things that we think were beyond
the control of any politician or political party.
Great sections of Northern population have moved into Southern states by reason of inevitable migratory movements within
the country itself. Florida is a notable example. As a great winter resort it has attracted thousands of Northerners,
who now make Florida their residence. These bring with them Republican sentiments.
[Meanwhile,] the urban element in the Democratic Party' has become predominant. There is the possibility that male
laborers may begin to align with the disgruntled rural minority in the Midwest... to permanently make the Republicans
the dominant Party.
The language is a little archaic, but the analysis feels awfully familiar. That was written by a left-leaning
newspaper in 1928, and we know what happened for the Democrats in 1932... (Z)