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New polls: WI
Dem pickups: (None)
GOP pickups: AZ GA ME NV NH PA WI

The Tide Turns?

Maybe the Democrats are better off if Joe Biden stands down. Maybe they are better off if Biden stays the course. It is difficult to know, one way or another. What is more clear is that Biden looks to be riding out the storm, and retaining his place as the Democratic nominee.

It is true that there was some adverse news for the President yesterday. Let's run down those stories first:

All of this said, there was considerably more positive news for Biden yesterday:

We would suggest there are two conclusions here. The first is that while there is still some disquiet in the Democratic ranks, there is no person or entity who really matters and who is calling for Biden to step down. We continue to believe that Jill Biden could get him to drop out, and that Barack Obama probably could, too. A unified showing from the Democratic leaders of Congress might do it. And if the Congressional Black Caucus turned against Biden, that might do it, too. But all of these folks remain on board (some with more enthusiasm than others). As long as that holds, he's going to stay in the race. Bolstering that position is that the various polls show that Biden either remains in a dead heat with Trump, or is within spitting distance of him, despite a disastrous couple of weeks.

The second conclusion, and we've written this before, is that there is a very strong media narrative right now, being embraced with particular vigor by some publications, that Biden is old and infirm and must step down. No narrative can last forever (at least, not without new fuel), and the next 6 weeks will have at least three major stories, namely the RNC, the DNC and the Olympics. Is it plausible, when there are no longer a dozen "Biden is losing his mind" stories everyday, that this storyline, along with memories of the debate, will start to fade? Yes, it is plausible, particularly if Biden doesn't do anything to bring the storyline back to life again.

Nobody knows what tomorrow will bring, in an unusually jam-packed week/lifetime for U.S. politics. But, at the moment, the overwhelming odds remain that Biden will be the Democratic candidate in the 2024 election. (Z)

If the Democrats Played Hardball...

There's a meme floating around right now in which the Democratic Party is invited, in words rather less refined than we prefer to use, to drop the veneer of civility and to start playing for keeps. Put another way, the argument is that faced with the prospect of Donald Trump, it's not just all-hands-on-deck time, it's also time to get Machiavellian.

As a thought exercise—and note, there is little to no evidence that any of these ideas are currently being pursued—we thought we'd put our creative writing hats on and think about what that might look like, if it were to come to pass. Our thinking here is that whether the Democrats stick with Joe Biden or move on to a different candidate, the party's needs are served by shining a harsh light on Donald Trump. Here are half a dozen ways that might be done:

  1. Double Dare: Of the items on this list, this one is the least original, as it's been discussed a fair bit, both here and elsewhere. But we think there is a pretty good argument for Biden to challenge Trump to take dueling neurological tests. While we recognize the downsides, the fact is that Trump would never agree to the arrangement, which would then change the narrative from "What is Biden hiding?" to "Biden is the one willing to be tested; what is Trump hiding?"

  2. Messaging Bills: In general, we tend to roll our eyes at messaging bills. However, the recent Supreme Court decisions offer some distinct opportunities. For example, how about the Presidents Cannot Commit Murder Act? Either Congressional Republicans can vote against the bill, and can go on the record as being in favor allowing presidents to commit murder, or they can get on board and Biden can have a big signing ceremony in which he makes clear that HE, at least, does not think presidents are above the law. Whatever happens, it will mean a couple of news cycles' worth of coverage of the subject.

  3. Executive Orders: Similarly, Biden could issue a bunch of outlandish executive orders, like one declaring that he is unilaterally adding ten justices to the Supreme Court, or that he's withholding payment of Congressional Republicans' salaries until they agree to pass his preferred budget for FY 2024-25. Then, he could withdraw the XOs the next day, and announce "This was just a demonstration. I never had any intention of abusing my powers in this way, even if the Supreme Court has opened the doors for me to do so. Do you think my opponent feels the same way?"

  4. Sotomayor: This would have to be handled very delicately, but if Sonia Sotomayor could be persuaded to step down weeks before the election, with a plausible excuse ("my doctors said I cannot push myself anymore"), and without time to seat a replacement before Election Day, then the Supreme Court would be on the ballot in black and white. Yes, this is high-risk, but we're playing for keeps here. No guts, no glory.

  5. Project 2025: This one is squarely in the ratfu**ing category. How about a well-heeled Democratic donor sets up a PAC with a generic name like the Take America Back PAC? And then, that person pays for apparent pro-Trump ads that lay out the "great ideas" from Project 2025 that he will implement if elected. Trump is desperately trying to put distance between himself and Project 2025, including the frightening statement from Heritage Foundation president Kevin Roberts that "We are in the process of the second American Revolution, which will remain bloodless if the left allows it to be." If the blue team does not find a way to make Trump own all of this, it's political malpractice.

  6. Conspiratorial Thinking: The Republicans have had some amount of success, in the past several decades, with damaging leading Democrats through conspiracy theories that are largely or entirely unsupported by evidence. Think about Barack Obama's birth certificate, Hillary Clinton and the pedophile pizza parlor, or Hunter Biden and Ukraine. Could the Democrats put the shoe on the other foot? For example, Donald Trump has been very low-visibility for the past couple of weeks. The common explanation is that the former president is following the old adage "when your opponent is hurting themselves, let them." But what if the real reason is... he's recovering from a heart attack? It may be thin, but there could be benefit in putting the Republicans on defense with one or more of these conspiracies, as opposed to their always being on offense.

If readers have their own thoughts on how the Democrats might get more Machiavellian, please send them along to comments@electoral-vote.com.

And note again that this is just a thought exercise in how Democrats might be able to change the narrative, particularly if the Party is willing to roll up its sleeves and get a little dirty. We recognize that some of these ideas come with significant risks/downsides. That said, we also recognize that the blue team is in a tough place right now, and that it's also fighting with one hand tied behind its back. The Democrats might have no choice but to untie that hand. (Z)

The New York Times Has Laid Its Cards on the Table

Yesterday, as we note above, The New York Times had yet another editorial calling for Joe Biden to step down. In addition, their list of recent op-eds included these six items:

  1. The Devil May Be Enjoying This Election Season, but I Am Not
  2. The Talented Democrats Who Aren't Running for President
  3. The Abyss Stares Back at Joe Biden
  4. James Carville: Biden Won't Win. Democrats Need a Plan. Here's One.
  5. I Share a Birthday With President Biden. Ask Me About Our Age.
  6. Please, Mr. President, Do the Right Thing

Only two of them (#1 and #5) devoted any meaningful attention to the notion that there are also reasons to be concerned about Donald Trump's continued candidacy.

We wrote about this phenomenon a week ago, and on that day the Times also had a bundle of stories piling on Biden. We still don't know exactly what is going on (we have plenty of theories), but we do know that New York Times executive editor Joe Kahn has a theory of his job that is... instructive, let's say. He sat for an interview with a former NYT reporter, Ben Smith, who asked about the newspaper's approach to the 2024 election. Kahn, who has only been on the job for 2 years, said that the paper went too far in taking sides in 2020, and would not be repeating "the excesses" of that election. Here is the specific quote that is getting the lion's share of the attention:

To say that the threats of democracy are so great that the media is going to abandon its central role as a source of impartial information to help people vote—that's essentially saying that the news media should become a propaganda arm for a single candidate, because we prefer that candidate's agenda. It is true that Biden's agenda is more in sync with traditional establishment parties and candidates. And we're reporting on that and making it very clear.

If you have time, it's worth reading the whole interview, which at least partly suggests that Kahn's main concern here is not some abstract philosophical position, but is instead trying to win back some of the readers that pretends-not-to-be-a-conservative Bari Weiss took with her when she left the paper.

In any case, if there's a clearer statement in support of journalistic bothsidesism than that quote from Kahn, we haven't seen it. Certainly, it is intellectually dishonest to propose that the only choices are "source of impartial information" and "propaganda arm." We are reminded that AP updated its style guide a few years ago to observe that it's OK to call a racist a racist, and that avoiding such verbiage, when it is appropriate, is not fair and balanced, it's just a different form of bias. We presume the same applies to calling a fascist a fascist.

Beyond that, however, Kahn's paper often fails to live up to the standard which he, himself, proposes. Is it sometimes critical of Trump? Yes, it is. Does the Times have days where it rakes the former president over the coals, flogging him with half a dozen or more different critical pieces, and calling for him to leave the race immediately? We have not seen a day like that, while Biden has gotten at least two such days in the last week.

We will also point out that, despite Kahn saying otherwise, the issue here is not Biden's "agenda." There are plenty of people, including many readers of this site, who do not much care for the President's agenda, but who will be voting for him nonetheless. And that is because the rather more important issue is Biden's approach to the presidency. If he is reelected, he can be expected to adhere to the norms of democratic government. We know that because he's done so for 3½ years. If Trump is reelected, he can be expected to disregard the norms of democratic government. We know that because he's done so for at least 6½ years. This is something very different from "Which candidate has the better ideas about tax rates?" or "Which candidate has the more attractive position on farm subsidies?"

In short, even if Kahn is speaking truth, we find his thinking to be... problematic. And, truth be told, we don't believe he is being entirely forthright. And the proof is in the pudding; the coverage of this election under his leadership has been wanting, and has come in for criticism far beyond just us. The Times still has many good people on staff, and will undoubtedly produce some good coverage of the presidential race. But, at least for our part, we'll be looking at their news coverage—and, even more so, their editorial pages—with a wary eye, and proceeding with much caution. (Z)

It's His Cult; We're Just Along for the Ride

The Republican National Convention starts next week. And even if you had spent the last decade living in a cave, it will be abundantly clear who runs the Republican Party, and who does not.

It's fair to say that Donald Trump's top two rivals for the GOP nomination this year—and, given how lopsided the primaries were, we use the term "rivals" loosely—were Gov. Ron DeSantis (R-FL) and Nikki Haley. In essence, DeSantis was the great white hope until he showed himself to have the political skills of a great white pelican and was forced to depart the race. Then, Nikki Haley took over as the alternative-of-choice, after which point she barely made a dent in Trump's armor.

DeSantis remains pretty Trumpy. Well, to be accurate, the Governor doesn't really grasp what Trumpism is about, but he does a passable job of pretending, and an excellent job of kissing Trump's a**. So, he got an invite to the Convention. Note that he was not given a speaking slot—after all, there are a mere 50 or 60 of those, not enough to find room for the governor of the nation's third most populous state. DeSantis will just be in the crowd, though he will also participate in a handful of satellite events, like a Moms for Liberty town hall.

This is, of course, a huge insult to DeSantis. It simultaneously communicates two things: (1) The current leadership of the Republican Party does not feel they need even a tiny bit of help from the Governor when it comes to winning the votes of his supporters, and (2) the current leadership of the Republican Party does not think the Governor is an important part of the Party's future. If DeSantis had even a scintilla of self-respect, he would take a pass on the Convention, rather than allow himself to be treated like this. But he lacks that self-respect, while at the same time continuing to fool himself that he's going to be a viable presidential candidate in 2028.

Haley, for her part, has done a much less effective job of performing Trumpism. In fact, she has been bold/foolish enough to criticize the Dear Leader. So, she is not invited to the Convention at all. That's no participation in the main dog and pony show, and no participation in any of the dog and pony shows happening on the side, either.

Despite this obvious snub, Haley announced yesterday that she will generously release her 97 delegates to vote for Trump. They were probably going to vote for him anyhow and, in any case, he doesn't need their votes. So, it's a meaningless gesture of support for a man who won't appreciate it and won't reciprocate in any way.

Haley framed her decision as an important statement of Republican "unity." When reporters pointed out that the Republicans are so "unified" they could not even be bothered to invite Haley to the Convention, a Haley spokesperson said: "[She] was not invited, and she's fine with that. Trump deserves the convention he wants. She's made it clear she's voting for him and wishes him the best." Who knows why Haley still has spokespeople. In any case, like DeSantis, she flatters herself that she's still a viable presidential candidate in 2028. We don't agree. There may be a Trump v2.0 one day, but DeSantis is not it. And it's been made very clear that while it's the Trumpublican Party, this "sorta Trumpy, sorta not" lane just does not work. If Haley doubts this, she might want to examine the corpses of Mike Pence, Asa Hutchinson, etc. (Z)

Report on the British Elections

Now that the dust has settled a bit, we have some comments on the results of the U.K. elections from two of our regular British correspondents. First up, S.T. in Worcestershire, England, UK:

In 1979, the Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan commented to one of his aides that "There are times, perhaps every 30 years, when there is a sea change in politics. I suspect that there is now such a sea change." Looking at the results of last week's General Election campaign, has this been a sea change election?

In truth, these elections happen rarely. Arguably there were only three in the U.K. in the 20th century. The Liberal victory in 1906 led to a series of social and economic reforms and ultimately, when the Conservative-controlled House of Lords obstructed, amended, or voted down these measures, led to the single most important constitutional change of the century, the abolition of the Lords veto (although only after two further general elections). Labour's first majority government in 1945 saw a series of social reforms, many of which are still on place, notably the totemic National Health Service, economic changes such as the nationalisation of key industries, new planning policies and regional policies, and the start of decolonization with Indian independence. The Conservative victory in 1979, forever to be associated with Margaret Thatcher, rejected government intervention and saw a policy of selling state enterprises and assets, moving from direct to indirect taxation and attempts to remove perceived barriers to economic growth.

We are now 45 years on from 1979 and arguably the changes made then have proved notably durable. Of course, that is partly because the Conservatives have been in sole or joint power for 32 of them. It is notable, though, that the Labour government between 1997 and 2010 took a "sticking plaster" approach, ameliorating specific problems with the introduction of a minimum wage and tax credits to assist the low-paid, and promoting some policies to aid social mobility and early life chances. The presumption, however, that the private sector was more effective than the public remained largely unchallenged, resulting notably in what proved to be the ruinously expensive "public-private partnerships." Whilst economic times were good, this seemed to suffice. When the banking crisis hit in 2008 it came under strain. The austerity program from 2010 onwards undid much of it.

The manifestos of the main parties in this election were notably timid when it came to change. The Conservatives, taking a pick-and-mix approach to the Thatcherite legacy, promoted tax cuts as the main panacea. Labour announced a few very limited tax increases and spending targets but little else. The LibDems promised specific funding on the health and care sectors. For Reform, ending immigration would just about solve every problem. Arguably, only the Greens offered a fresh vision of any scale. All parties offered "carefully costed" programs which, under examination, proved laughable.

Yet this seems odd. In many ways the Thatcherite legacy is proving deeply flawed. Many of the U.K.'s most endemic problems have been created or exacerbated by it. To give a few examples: The ever widening gulf between the rich and the rest, and between the South East and the remainder of the country; a widely dysfunctional and expensive housing and rental market; a healthcare system with record waiting lists and a social care system in near collapse; high levels of debt in both the public and private realms; previously state-owned utilities and assets now operating as private monopolies and oligopolies; an emaciated local government with several councils (including Birmingham, the largest in the country) having declared effective bankruptcy and more to follow. Growth is weak and investment levels miserable.

The level of change proposed by the parties rarely exceeds 1% of GDP. It seems inadequate to address the issues faced. And an intellectual argument to support change—as was in place in 1906, 1945 and 1979—seems largely absent. New PM Kier Starmer's solution is "growth," but whilst a more stable political scene is probably a necessary prerequisite to achieve this, it is unlikely to create it per se—and have you ever met a politician who opposes growth?

So unless Starmer shows a willingness to go much further than his campaign promised, this does not appear to be a sea change election. Merely just another footnote in the U.K.'s relative decline?
And now, A.B. in Lichfield, England, UK:
Elections are sometimes as much about expectation management as they are about the actual results, and it says much about the slightly surreal nature of the U.K. election that Labour are likely slightly disappointed at their massive landslide victory, because their 412 seats fell just short of the 418 won in Tony Blair's 1997 landslide victory, while the Conservatives are likely slightly relieved that they didn't do worse, despite their 121-seat total easily falling below the previous worst result in the party's history (the 156 seats won in the 1906 Liberal landslide). But, then, most polls had Labour doing better, and the Conservatives doing worse, than the final result.

Back in May, I wrote a summary of what I thought were the "eight key points to look out for" in this election. Let's quickly revisit those, as they help to unpack what happened last Thursday:
  1. How well will Labour recover in the "Red Wall" seats? Easy answer: spectacularly. The traditional Labour-voting seats in the post-industrial Midlands and North of England (the equivalent of the Midwest Rust Belt) were won back resoundingly. Outside a smattering of the wealthier districts of London and Birmingham, there's barely an urban seat in Great Britain held by the Conservative Party. The Red Wall hasn't just been recaptured, it's been extended. Labour also found themselves winning rural seats in the Midlands and North where the Conservatives had won more than 50% of the vote in the last election.

  2. How well will Labour recover in Scotland? Arguably even more spectacularly. In 2019, the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) won 45% of the Scottish vote, and 48 of the 59 Scottish seats. Labour won just one seat in Scotland, coming fourth in seat total behind the Conservative Party (6 seats) and LibDems (4). In last week's elections, the SNP—dragged down by years of scandal, political mismanagement, internal disagreements over social policy, and hubris—were reduced to just 9 seats, while Labour won 37 of the Scottish seats (the LibDems were on 6, and Conservatives on 5). Labour has returned to a position of dominance in Scotland it hasn't held since its support collapsed in the 2015 general election, and even the SNP are conceding that independence is off the table for the foreseeable future. The SNP arguably had the worst night of any major party. Even the Conservatives could take some occasional crumbs of comfort in aspects of the result across the U.K. as a whole; there are no crumbs for the SNP.

  3. How well will the Liberal Democrats do in the "Blue Wall"? Are we tired of me writing "spectacularly," yet? The LibDems, the traditional, centrist third party in the UK, won 72 seats, the best result for any third party since their predecessors in the old Liberal Party won 158 seats in the 1923 election—not bad for a party that only won 11 seats in the 2019 election. While the Party now holds seats across U.K., from the southern tip of Cornwall to Orkney and Shetland off the north of Scotland, much of their success came from winning seat after seat in traditionally Conservative seats in the south of England. There's now a band of 39 contiguous Lib Dem-held seats between North Devon in the southwest and Eastbourne in the southeast, forming a yellow wall around the remaining Conservative seats in the region.

  4. How badly will the Conservatives do in London? Very badly indeed. They now hold only 9 of the capital's 73 seats, with the LibDems holding 6, and Labour holding all but one of the rest. That sole exception is former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who ran and held his seat as an independent after being expelled from the Party. One of the notes of caution for Labour this election is in their loss of 5 seats to pro-Gaza independents in urban seats across England, with 4 of those (the exception again being Corbyn) in areas with a notably high percentage of Muslim voters. So while the impact of Gaza may not have been significant, it was nonetheless notable.

  5. How well will Reform UK do? This is... complicated. Back in May I predicted that the populist hard-right Reform would split the right, but fail to get any MPs elected; in the end, they managed to elect 5, and came third in share of the vote (behind the Conservatives, but ahead of the LibDems). That, however, was before Friend of Trump Nigel Farage announced that he was taking over as party leader again, and would be contesting the seat of Clacton. This pushed the party towards winning a handful of seats, but they remain less ruthless and effective than the LibDems in targeting winnable constituencies. Their real impact was, paradoxically, in helping Labour and the LibDems. Reform won just over 14% of the vote across the U.K., while Labour won 34% (yes, nearly two-thirds of seats on just over a third of the vote), the Conservatives 24%, and the LibDems 12%. But in the U.K. system, you only need to win the most number of votes in a constituency, not 50% of the vote. So in the Welsh seat of Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, for example, the LibDem candidate won the seat with just 29.5% of the vote. Reform came fourth, but a hypothetical combined Conservative and Reform vote total would have comprised 40% of the vote and won the seat. This will have profound implications for the Conservative Party over the next few years, as they decide whether to tack to the center to attract Labour and LibDem voters, or tack to the right to attract Reform voters. Meanwhile, Farage won Clacton, and will seek to be a loud and disruptive voice in British political discussions.

  6. Will tactical voting hurt the Conservatives? A strong yes. Across the U.K., centrist and center-left voters were willing to vote for the party best-placed to defeat the Conservatives rather than their preferred party, and this significantly increased seat totals for Labour and the LibDems while depressing the Conservative total. Alongside the rise of Reform, this is one of the two factors that hurt the Conservatives the most.

  7. Will Nationalists/Republicans win more seats than Unionists in Northern Ireland? Yes, but with caveats. Of the parties in the Nationalist/Republication tradition, Sinn Féin won 7 of the 18 Northern Irish seats, with the traditionally more moderate SDLP winning another 2; in both cases, this was the same number of seats won in 2019. Meanwhile, the scandal-ridden Democratic Unionists slumped from the 8 seats they won in 2019 to just 5. However, none of the three lost seats were won by Nationalists. One was won by the more moderate Ulster Unionists, one by the more hardline True Unionists, and one by the non-sectarian cross-community Alliance Party. So Sinn Féin becoming the largest Northern Irish party (with the important note that they still abstain from taking up their Westminster seats) is arguably down to splits in Unionism rather than SF winning more seats. This is nonetheless a potentially significant symbolic moment in Northern Irish politics.

  8. Whither Wales? An expenses scandal facing Labour Welsh First Minister Vaughan Gething had very little impact on the overall result in the country. Labour maintained their stranglehold on the old mining and industrial districts, the Welsh Nationalists of Plaid Cymru won the 4 seats where the Welsh language still has the strongest presence, the LibDems won a single rural seat, and the Conservatives were completely wiped out.
So what does this all mean? Labour's victory is simultaneously broad but shallow. If voters in the next election (due no later than 2029) are less willing to vote tactically, if the split on the right is somehow addressed, if the SNP recover in Scotland (and support for independence remains static at 45% or so, even as support for the main pro-independence party has collapsed), if Gaza continues to be an issue, then Labour could be in for a much rougher time than their massive 2024 majority might suggest. Again, they've won nearly two-thirds of the seats in Parliament on only just over a third of the vote. And the in-tray facing Keir Starmer is formidable.

At the same time, I'm perhaps more cautiously optimistic than my compatriot S.T. Tone matters; so does competence. Starmer is widely perceived as slightly boring, but after the last 8 years of chaos since the Brexit referendum, many U.K. voters would welcome a period of quietly competent serious government in the national interest, as opposed to in the interests of the perpetual internal psychodramas of the Conservative Party, even where they might disagree with individual policies. If Starmer can deliver on the latter, and can also show clear evidence of incremental improvements on the challenges the country faces, voters might well be relieved.

I'll close by noting two significant differences between U.K. elections and recent U.S. elections. The farewell speech from Rishi Sunak saw the outgoing PM take full responsibility for the poor result, acknowledge public anger towards his party, and offer gracious and generous praise to Keir Starmer, describing him as a "decent, public-spirited man, who I respect." The contrast with Trump couldn't be sharper. Meanwhile, we're replacing a Hindu Prime Minister of South Asian heritage with an atheist who celebrates the Shabbat on a weekly basis with his observant Jewish wife and children; Evangelical Protestantism is virtually absent in political debate, and Christianity isn't a prerequisite for prime ministers.

Thanks to both of you! We still have reader perspectives on other foreign elections in the hopper, which will be published shortly, followed by some meta commentary from us. (Z)

Today's Presidential Polls

See what we wrote above about "spitting distance." Plus, Fabrizio has a pro-Republican house effect of about 2 points. However, John Anzalone usually works for the Democrats. (Z)

State Joe Biden Donald Trump Start End Pollster
Wisconsin 45% 50% Jun 28 Jul 02 Fabrizio + Anzalone

Click on a state name for a graph of its polling history.


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