Dem
47
GOP
53
We had one last set of reader comments on the recent German election to run, and we wanted to get them in before moving on to the Canadian election. So:
T.K. in Freiburg, Germany, writes: I think an update on the latest developments after the Federal Election in Germany might be useful:
- Friedrich Merz has performed a 180-degree turnaround on the debt brake. Whereas before the election he still wanted to adhere strictly to it, two "special funds" (in reality "special debts") are now intended. This was agreed in the coalition negotiations between the CDU/CSU and SPD.
- However, one should not believe that this is already a done deal. For one thing, the agreement of the Greens is needed to achieve the two-thirds majority required in Parliament, for which the Greens will make it a condition that the "special funds" are used to finance climate projects. Secondly, the approval of the federal states is also required. This is only guaranteed where the government consists of the parties of the desired coalition. Otherwise it is questionable. Furthermore, the opposition parties have announced a constitutional complaint, arguing that the special fund should be decided by the already dissolved Parliament instead of the newly elected Bundestag. Should the Federal Constitutional Court uphold this, the special fund would have failed.
- Nevertheless, I think that this special fund will be implemented in some form or other, because the new federal government could at least enforce the special fund for the Bundeswehr (the military) by simple resolution with reference to the existence of an emergency situation. The Constitutional Court would hardly object to this, especially as the Federal Government would have a comprehensible argument at hand with the possible reduction or even cessation of any American military support. I also think that the support of parties outside the new coalition can be won in some form, albeit in return for concessions that will dilute the effect that the special fund is intended to achieve.
- Economically this special fund would be a questionable matter, not least because other European countries would not be able to follow suit because they do not have the necessary financial leeway. With the expected rise in interest rates, they will find it more difficult to finance their regular budgets. So it is still difficult to predict what will come out of this, but it would send a very strong signal to the outside world (in fact, it already does).
- Overall, we are dealing with a change in policy, comparable to the time of German reunification. Stock and bond prices have already reacted. It is no exaggeration to speak of a "game changer." Without Donald Trump, whether you like it or not (you probably won't), this would probably not have happened so quickly. In chess, one would speak of zugzwang.
Developments are very much in flux and the situation could change significantly in just a few days.
M.C. in Greece, NY, writes: Germany and Europe are affected by four major trends since World War II:
- The creation of NATO, whose main goals have been to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.
- The realization of a continent-wide and centuries-long political, economic and legal integration culminating in the European Union.
- The four generations of feminism that have added the formerly ignored half of civilization to the impressive and progressive brain trust of European politics, science, business and culture.
- A coming population collapse, in particular in central, eastern and southern Europe that will be catastrophic economically and politically.
As drought from climate change and displacement from war distress the Middle East, there has been a nearly two decade "emergency" immigration into Europe of Islamic refugees from countries that are, in part or in toto, failed states, unable to provide food, water and safe housing for an increasingly large number of their residents.
Into this volatile mix two major factors have served as an unstoppable catalyst for the rise of extreme-right parties:
- The multicultural mix of Christians and Muslims has, generally, not gone well. This time is no exception.
- The economic dislocation placed on working-class folks from the failures of globalism and, to name one other factor, increasing automation, has enraged people who used to vote left, but have now swung hard to the right.
Not helping any of this developing mess has been the ascendancy of Donald Trump as POTUS. An inveterate blamer personality whose subtext is always "I deserve the most attention" and "I am going to rip you off," Trump has encouraged the European far-right while aggressively denigrating NATO, the EU and feminism, along with promoting the idea that there is no such a thing as climate change. Trump's insistence that feminism and non-white low-educated immigrants are an existential threat play right into the pitch lines of what were once lunatic-fringe right-wing parties on the Continent.
The questions are: With all the damage done to the formerly prosperous established order, what will happen to NATO, the EU, the rights of women and Muslim immigrants in light of demographically shrinking economies? In particular, with a bellicose, but demographically and economically declining Russia wanting to impose its hegemony as far as possible into northern, central and southern Europe? Will borscht replace currywurst in Berlin food stalls?
J.B. in Aarhus, Denmark, writes: Here in Denmark, people are generally satisfied with the outcome of the election. The visceral feeling of disdain/dislike for the Germans (who occupied their country in World War II) had mainly dissipated for Danes during the four years of comparison between Angela Merkel and Donald Trump. Most of the Danish population can reluctantly accept a federative (dilatory) participation in a Teutonic Nation where they never could before, a 1,000-year Reich.
If you had told me a month ago that 21% of Germans were Nationalsozialistische sympathizers, I would have said: "hmm, seems low." This 21% is most likely true for any country, including here in my home country. (It is also important to recognize that the bulk of support for the AfD (Aryans for Deutschland) stems from the Prussian/East German provinces).
I don't think Americans realize the extent of how horrified Europeans were by whole J.D. Vance/Pete Hegseth dog-and-pony show in Munich. And, don't get me started on the Greenlandic state-of-affairs.
Relatively speaking, I think most Europeans think the results yesterday are as hunky-dory as one can expect... during the age of Drumpf.
J.R. in Berlin, Germany, writes: You wrote: "The neo-Nazi AfD Party did worse than the polls showed it would do, and it is unlikely that endorsements by Elon Musk and J.D. Vance made any difference."
It is really a stretch to call the AfD a "neo-Nazi" party. Yes, there are fringe elements that sympathize with the Nazis. But the core of the party is the voters disenfranchised by Angela Merkel's cohabitation with the SPD for 12 years, bringing a Grand Coalition mush that left the right wide open for voters who, justifiably, blanched at her grabbing her ankles on immigration.
We could just as justifiably call the Republicans, now dominated by the MAGAt party majority with their own 1930s-style fascist proclivities, a neo-Nazi party.
I am a U.S. citizen who has fled for higher ground, and do not fear the AfD anywhere nearly as much as I fear the post-modern GOP.
Thanks, again, to everyone who wrote in with their thoughts! (Z)