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The other factor, when it comes to how events unfold in Israel, is Iran. Hezbollah and Hamas are both proxies for the Iranian government, and receive money and other support from the Iranians. So, as long as Iran wants a war in Israel, Iran is likely to get a war in Israel.
Last week, we had an item about how Israel was carefully planning its response to the missile attack that Iran had directly launched against them. The Biden administration was a part of this process, trying to moderate the Israeli response in hopes of preventing a much larger war from breaking out in the Middle East.
Reportedly, the Israeli response is ready to go. Not too much is known about it, for obvious reasons, but Benjamin Netanyahu has assured Joe Biden that the targets will be military, and not Iran's oil or nuclear facilities. An attack on the oil would likely send gas prices skyrocketing, which is not something the White House wants right before an election. And an attack on the nuclear plants would potentially unleash vast devastation, harming innocent civilians within, and likely beyond, Iran's borders. Even the Russians have weighed in on that particular issue, telling Israel they better not try it, at risk of facing Russian wrath.
In that piece last week, we also had some commentary on the geopolitics of the Middle East, courtesy of reader P.B. in St. Louis. There was much positive response to that. For example, here's reader M.A.A. in New York City, NY: "This is the sort of informed geopolitical commentary I absolutely live for. The more P.B. is willing to write in with these sorts of perspective pieces, the happier I will be." We tend to agree, particularly with subjects so far removed from our areas of expertise.
That said, there was also much critical commentary. So, we selected one of those that hit on most of the points being raised, and we sent it to P.B. for a response. Here's the reader letter we chose, from O.E. in Greenville, SC:
I have been reading your site for a while, and no commenter has upset me more than P.B.'s recent letter. It is quite upsetting in many ways, both for inaccuracies, and for what the writer appears to be comfortable with.
First, the author wishes to blame many foreign conflicts on Russia, implying that Russia created South Ossetia and Abkhazia as puppet regimes from Georgia, and that Russia "invaded" Moldova to prop up Transnistria. In fact, all three nations declared their independence from both the Soviet Union and the aforementioned former Soviet republics in 1990. Further, any Russian military presence in those regions was agreed to by both Moldova (with the encouragement of Victor Yuschenko of Ukraine) and Georgia (prior to Georgia launching the South Ossetia war).
Second, the author describes Iran as seeking to destabilize Syria. In fact, Iranian and Russian forces led the way in targeting the so-called Islamic State, and helped prevent Syria and Kurdistan from falling into the tender mercies of Daesh.
Thirdly, contrary to the author's estimates, Russia continues to advance in Ukraine. Any Russian costs from sanctions, seizures, and military losses is exceeded by the costs of increased Western military spending, Western businesses in Russia being seized or sold to Russians, increased costs to Westerners from loss of access to Russian resources, and the loss of Ukrainian citizens, be it to war, leaving for the West, or leaving to join Russia.
What is most shocking is the author's praise for the recent ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. Like the aforementioned regions, Artsakh declared their independence in 1990. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan sought to retake the territory, and Artsakh was not able to obtain any outside support. Almost all the residents have fled to Armenia proper, and their long history is under threat, with some referring to it as a second Armenian genocide.
I realize my foreign policy views may not match many of the posters here. I may not have much knowledge of foreign policy, and my education may be less than P.B.'s, but I do not share P.B.'s enthusiastic views on foreign policy, and I find P.B.'s support for the unambiguous ethnic cleansing in Artsakh to be even more disturbing than the views expressed on other topics.
And here is the response from P.B.:
The goal of my letter last week was to outline the thinking of the Biden administration and the majority of the U.S. foreign policy community. The intent was to describe the situation from a U.S.-centric point of view and not to either endorse that point of view as the objective truth, or approve of all actions taken by the U.S. and pro-U.S. entities.
The letter from O.E. in Greenville is a very helpful counterpoint to that description. The author quite effectively describes the same situation from a Russian-centric point of view, and both of our descriptions, taken together, show how conflict almost inevitably arises if states focus primarily on pursuing their geopolitical interests (which most states do). Again, this is not intended as an endorsement of states behaving in this way, just a description of the fact that currently, that is what most states do. Discussing potential alternatives and ways to change this status quo is outside the scope of this letter.
Most of the criticisms that O.E. raises relate to various frozen or semi-frozen conflicts in the Russian/post-Soviet periphery. Modern Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, behaves very much as a continuation of the Russian Empire. That is, it is a large territory, politically centered around and controlled by Moscow and the surrounding regions where ethnic Russians are a majority. When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, many of these peripheral regions gained independence from Russia, but were eventually reintegrated into the Soviet Union, largely as a result of World War II. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many of these regions again regained their independence. Vladimir Putin and his circle of Russian leadership view this disintegration of empire as a political and economic catastrophe, with the Russian President stating in 2005: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."
That's the general geopolitical view of Russian leadership at this time. Now on to the specific criticisms raised by O.E.:First, the author wishes to blame many foreign conflicts on Russia, implying that Russia created South Ossetia and Abkhazia as puppet regimes from Georgia, and that Russia "invaded" Moldova to prop up Transnistria. In fact, all three nations declared their independence from both the Soviet Union and the aforementioned former Soviet republics in 1990.O.E. is 100% correct that these three regions declared independence in the early 1990s as part of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Whether or not Russia invaded to create puppet regimes, or merely acted to support the self-determination of people in these regions, definitely depends on one's point of view. I gave the rough perspective of the U.S. government, and O.E. gave the rough perspective of the Russian government. It is important to point out that a number of other regions declared independence in the same timeframe, and only the pro-Russian movements were supported by the Russian military, while others (such as Chechnya) were violently suppressed.Further, any Russian military presence in those regions was agreed to by both Moldova (with the encouragement of Victor Yuschenko of Ukraine) and Georgia (prior to Georgia launching the South Ossetia war).I definitely disagree with this characterization of the situation. A Russian military presence only arose in those regions as a result of their intervention in various wars (the 1990 Transnistria War, the 1991 South Ossetia War, the 1992 War in Abkhazia, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War), and to say that their presence was agreed to in those cases is misleading at best—Moldova and Georgia both lost those wars, and as a result were in no position to dispute the presence of Russian troops.Second, the author describes Iran as seeking to destabilize Syria. In fact, Iranian and Russian forces led the way in targeting the so-called Islamic State, and helped prevent Syria and Kurdistan from falling into the tender mercies of Daesh.To be more accurate with my statements, Iran funds and maintains allied militias in Syria with the intent to maintain influence in that country and prevent the formation of a strong government that could oppose Iranian influence. It is certainly true that Iran and Russia helped to target and defeat Daesh (known more commonly in the west as the Islamic State), but that is an unusual situation—Daesh is enemies of everyone and friends to none, and I wouldn't agree that Russia and Iran "led the way" against them. Significant contributions were made by the U.S., the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi government, and Turkey in a complicated and dramatic "the enemy of my enemy is my reluctant ally" situation.Thirdly, contrary to the author's estimates, Russia continues to advance in Ukraine. Any Russian costs from sanctions, seizures, and military losses is exceeded by the costs of increased Western military spending, Western businesses in Russia being seized or sold to Russians, increased costs to Westerners from loss of access to Russian resources, and the loss of Ukrainian citizens, be it to war, leaving for the West, or leaving to join Russia.Of all of O.E.'s comments, this comes the closest to parroting Russian propaganda. It is difficult to know exactly what is going on with the Russian economy, but their non-military economy has certainly contracted significantly, their hydrocarbon exports are also down significantly (in both volume and value) from 2022 levels, and somewhere between several hundred thousand and one million Russians, generally skewing well-educated, have left Russia since the start of the Ukraine War. Regarding the ongoing war itself, while there are minor shifts in the front line (including a recent Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Kursk region), the area under control by both sides has barely changed in over a year. As to the costs to the West, they are certainly less than the costs of directly waging a war against Russia, and certainly less than the costs in equipment and human lives being paid by both Russia and Ukraine. Whether the U.S. policy of continued but limited support to Ukraine is the best policy for the U.S. or Ukraine is certainly an open question, but it is also certainly not a benefit to Russia.What is most shocking is the author's praise for the recent ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. Like the aforementioned regions, Artsakh declared their independence in 1990. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan sought to retake the territory, and Artsakh was not able to obtain any outside support. Almost all the residents have fled to Armenia proper, and their long history is under threat, with some referring to it as a second Armenian genocide.To be perfectly clear, the recent ethnic cleansing of Artsakh is horrific. Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to leave their homes and move to Armenia, which may or may not technically constitute genocide but is definitely a type of ethnic cleansing. The situation, however, is more complicated than O.E. implies.
As a quick rundown of the situation, before and during the breakup of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The result was an Armenian victory, resulting in Armenian control of both Nagorno-Karabakh (the Armenian-majority enclave within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan), as well as approximately 9% of Azeri territory outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. The peace deal, brokered by Russia, saw the freezing of the conflict in a way that helped maintain Russian influence over both countries. In 2020, Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and defeated Armenia, taking back all of the territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh as well as around 40% of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Again, a peace agreement was negotiated by Russia, and Russian troops were stationed in the region to maintain it. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan saw an opportunity to launch the Third Nagorno-Karabakh War and conquer the remaining territory.
This series of wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in terrible atrocities on both sides, and I wish that they received a fraction of the attention in the West that the Israel-Hamas war is receiving. It seems that most western countries don't especially care about the situation, perhaps because the end result is that both countries now, for the first time, maintain sovereignty within (and only within) their internationally recognized borders. However, from a geopolitical perspective, the result is certainly a loss for Russia (and to a lesser extent, Iran).
Thanks to both of you for your contributions. We will point out to readers that we do this not as one of those point-counterpoint pieces, which seem a bit gimmicky to us, but as academics, in the spirit of scholarly debate. (Z)